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Ownership structure’s effect on financial 
performance: An empirical analysis of Jordanian 
listed firms
Amneh Alkurdi1*, Amneh hamad2, Hussam Thneibat3 and Mahmoud Elmarzouky4
Abstract:  This study aims to examine the impact of the ownership structure on firm 
performance in the Jordan. This study employed the multiple-regression model and 
fixed regression effect to analyse the data. The sample included all Jordanian first 
market firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) from 2012 to 2018. The 
paper’s findings reveal a positive and significant relationship between institutional 
ownership and both accounting measure Return on Assets (ROA) and market 
measure Tobin’s Q (TQ). Other ownership structure types, such as concentration of 
ownership, also affect ROA and TQ. While managerial ownership shows a negative 
relationship with ROA, but there is no association with TQ. This study has broad and 
comprehensive practical implications that are good for policymakers. On the one 
hand, it adds to the debate on agency theory from the ownership structure and 
firm’s performance relationship. On the other hand, it helps the Jordanian 
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1. Introduction
A firm’s performance is an essential key behind any success of countries. Notably, financial 
performance (FP) is one of the available instruments used to maximise firm profits. It has become 
a source of concern for both shareholders and management. Jensen and Meckling (1976) assert 
that FP is crucial to every firm’s survival by strengthening its ability to reach sustainable return. 
Furthermore, a firm’s success, using an adequate level of FP, is the mirror of the management 
ability to pursue their stewardship duties to preserve shareholder’s investments better.
Many tools are used to enhance the levels of firm performance. The ownership structure is one 
of these tools. Galego et al. (2019) argued that ownership structure is classified as one of the most 
effective tools employed to assist the board of directors in enhancing the FP. Furthermore, the 
board’s efficiency may depend on the overall diversity of the ownership structure (Cho & Kim, 
2007). According to Omran et al. (2008), the ownership structure represents a powerful incentive 
for managers to gain control over firms and sustain a better performance. This is due to various 
ownership structures extended to solving agency problems and increasing trust between the 
managers and the shareholders.
The relationship between ownership structure and FP has been the central topic of various 
scholars, academics, and policymakers for a long time. This relationship depends on various 
types of ownership that handle investment strategies other than the investment horizons that 
may affect FP (Kuo et al., 2020). Yasser et al. (2017) argued that the direction of this relationship is 
due to variances in monitoring those that the shareholders can undertake. In this light, Mardnly 
et al. (2018) found that the monitoring functions of the board have become significant. Moreover, 
firms are organised by CG mechanisms based primarily on their ownership structures which, in 
turn, influence the board decisions. On the other hand, some prior studies claim that the ownership 
structure may lead to conflicts of interest between shareholders and management. This conflict 
can minimise the firm’s worth, mainly if managers are more concerned with optimising their 
interests at the cost of the owners’ needs (Khan & Zahid, 2020).
In light of previous literature conclusions and within the context of the agency theory, the 
critical question of the current study is to explore whether the ownership structure leads to 
enhancing the FP or not? This question prompted a focus on a series of objectives. The first one 
is to determine the role of ownership structure in enhancing and sustaining the firm’s performance 
that can provide the management and investors with valuable suggestions for the firms’ success. 
The second objective is to fill the related research gap in recent years, especially in the Jordanian 
context. The last objective is to provide a better understanding of the level of efficiency and 
effectiveness of FP that can be enhanced by various groups of ownership such as (managerial, 
institutions and concentration ownership), and their influential controlling role on management 
behaviour that makes Jordan an optimal area to perform this study.
This paper contributes to the existing literature from many points. First, we are motivated to 
investigate this relationship between ownership structure and FP for firms listed on the Amman 
Stock Exchange (ASE). This due to there is no agreement on the empirical results on the relation-
ship between ownership structure and both accounting and market FP measures in developing 
markets. Second, the study findings will benefit policymakers by assisting managers to modify 
their decisions of enhancing FP. Furthermore, stakeholders and investors can formulate a suitable 
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picture of the ownership structure usefulness in enhancing their decisions related to the firm’s 
performance. Thirdly, few studies have investigated the impact of managerial Ownership on FP, 
especially in emerging economies like Jordan’s market. So, it is crucial to take a closer look at 
Jordan’s market, which will benefit researchers, investors, and lawmakers by improving that 
market. Finally, the current study shows that agency theory can be explained deeply from the 
association between different groups of ownership and both accounting and market FP indecators.
The remainder of this study is organised as follows: the background is presented in section 2, 
and then we illustrate the theoretical literature review in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the 
empirical literature review and hypotheses development. Section 5 presents the research design. 
Section 6 highlights empirical results and discussion. Finally, section 7 points to the study’s 
conclusions, limitations and makes suggestions for future research.
2. Background
Like other emerging economies, the Jordanian economy is categorised as developing. Jordan’s 
economic policy aims to increase investment, maximise growth, build employment opportunities, 
and increase citizens’ living standards (Bataineh, 2021). Throughout the past two decades, Jordan 
has successfully walked the road to a free market economy. Following the launching of the policy 
for privatisation, the Government retained an ongoing interest in enhancing the financial market to 
raise investor confidence and draw further investment (Alhababsah, 2019). The authority in Jordan 
made considerable efforts to formalise an attractive business environment. These efforts started 
from establishing the Jordan stock market in year 1978, representing the oldest financial market in 
Jordan. There are many objectives that the Jordan stock market focused on it, such as constructing 
a formal structured system for firms to increase their capital and provide assistance to individuals 
to enabling them to trade their shares in the Jordanian market.
ASE, examined as the largest financial market in Jordan, contains various sectors. To ensure 
a healthy economic environment, ASE has several objectives: the trading securities market should 
be structured, fair, and practical. This will increases the level of trust of this market and increases the 
efficiency of the Jordanian economy. Another objective that ASE focused on is operating, managing, 
and developing all securities markets activities inside and outside Jordan. These objectives can be 
reflected positively on enhancing the awareness of investing in the financial markets and expanding 
the knowledge related to the level of the ASE services.
The majority of firms in developing countries, including Jordan, have issues with transparency 
problems, inadequate protection of investor rights, and agency problems. These weaknesses refer 
to a lack of consistent rules and adequate oversight (Al-Shattarat et al., 2018). Thus, firms will 
suffer from a market deficiency. A firm’s ability is restricted to access external capital and outside 
investors. Another consequence of market weakness is that minority shareholders investments 
would be harmed by influencer shareholders who have authority over their assets. Thus, this study 
anticipates that the ownership structure, which is one of the CG tools, can play an essential role in 
protecting shareholders’ wealth and would significantly impact FP.
In 2009, The Jordanian Government issued the CG code (Makhlouf et al., 2014). CG has been 
described as a condition for sustainable development and economic stability (Abed et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, it works to help Jordanian firms skip the problems they face, such as reducing 
unemployment rate and enhancing the firm’s success. In addition, various stakeholders have 
started to recognise the critical importance of good CG practices, that is, the role of ownership 
structure in maximises the firm performance stability. Alabdullah (2018) asserted that firms’ 
activities within the CG board are better than those not working in the CG area. Thus, various CG 
scholars have attempted to investigate the association between the ownership structure and FP.
Due to the different economic environments, studies that have been done on the FP area are 
different between developed and developing countries. Many attributes distinguish between 
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developed and developing countries, such as stock market investor protection and the degree of 
ownership concentration. This variation can lead to a shift in our thinking about a firm’s performance 
in developing countries. Other factors, especially in Jordan, drive the review of the firm’s performance. 
First, compared to most countries globally, Jordan ranks at a low level in providing investor protection 
secondly, the ownership is highly concentrated. As a result, our research investigates the relationship 
between ownership structure and FP in the Jordanian market.
3. Theoretical literature review
3.1. Related theories
3.1.1. Agency theory 
One of the most widely used theories in literature is agency theory. It was proposed by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Fama & Jensen (1983). They indicated that agency problems were increased due 
to the asymmetry of information among owners and managers. Managers have an incentive to 
behave in an opportunist way to serve their interests, but this may abuse shareholders’ interests. This 
behaviour may induce firms to be less informative in terms of accounting for their earnings. Beatty 
and Harris (1998) argued that a problem that resulted from agency theory is one of the main 
motivations of ownership structure. It is commonly seen as the initial point for any CG discussion. 
Warokka et al. (2012) asserts that companies have various ownership structures with extensive 
holdings focused on decisions made by management. This enables investors to guarantee that 
management decisions are in alignment with shareholders’ interests.
Although a contractual association between managers and owners meant that managers had 
it imposed upon them to work as representatives of the owners’ interests, Vu et al. (2018) found 
that managers are trying to protect their interests against the interests of the owners. This, in 
turn, adversely affects the FP because firms rely deeply on the managerial decisions that are 
likely to help sustain a firm’s performance. As an unethical decision taken by management may 
harm the shareholders’ interests, many studies have argued that there is an essential need to 
shape the phenomena that align both shareholders’ and managers’ benefits, such as ownership 
structure. Furthermore, this will then enhance the performance of firms in the long run (Buallay 
et al., 2017). Kao et al. (2019) suggest that for better long-term performance and minimise 
agency problems, the ownership structure will put more effort into controlling management 
decisions that lead to decreased agency costs and asymmetries of information. As Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argued early on, the ownership structure is described as a tool to minimise 
agency costs. However, within the firm, there are disputes among various parties. To solve such 
conflicts, companies should look for an ownership structure that permits managers to become 
more conscious of their full potential and act in the shareholder’s interest. Empirical evidence 
from Hatzell et al. (2014) reported that the ownership structure reduces agency costs by 
influencing how the company is run and regulated. This includes conceptual rules to grant 
accountability and fairness in the managers’ and shareholders’ relationships.
The literature reviewed has addressed two approaches that may mitigate the consequences of 
agency problems. Siregar and Utama (2008) argued that approaches could help owners enhance 
owners’ ability to oversee the management functions or increase management ownership by 
holding more shares in firms, then obtaining share incentives rather than cash. The first approach 
is called the “refraining approach.” This approach introduces the notion that managers avoid 
opportunistic behaviour only when their interest aligns with the shareholders’ concerns 
(Emanuel et al., 2003). Examples of the “refraining approach” consist of the dividend payment, 
an active board structure, independent audit committees, and the influencer institutional share-
holders (Jackling & Johl, 2009). Also, the encouraging, which is based on encourages management 
to engage in beneficial activities. This approach consists of remuneration contingent upon results 
and employee share ownership programs (Nikoskelainen & Wright, 2007a).
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3.1.2. Stakeholder theory 
Freeman’s (1984) proposed the stakeholder theory. He argued that management should address 
the needs of various groups of stakeholders. Earlier, many studies assert that the different 
Stakeholder has a different interest. This should push management to save the stakeholder 
benefits. Satisfying stakeholders need related to firm reputation (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Thus, 
working to help stakeholders obtain proper decision-making may enhance the firms FP. Khan and 
Zahid (2020) found that CG tools such as ownership structure aid in managed firm resources 
efficiently, by reducing managers expropriation resources and help stakeholders to get their 
benefits.
Based on firms’ goal related to sustainable financial success, stakeholder theory was built on 
giving stakeholders formal and binding control over the firm. Specifically, over the board of 
directors. Almahrog et al. (2018) admit that Stakeholder tends to provide a more comprehensive 
interpretation of how ownership structure affects FP. Because of the stakeholders’ authority and 
legitimacy, managers can respond to pressures exercised by various stakeholders. Many studies 
assert that stakeholder power proposes that managerial decisions regarding FP (Grougiou et al., 
2014). Phillips et al. (2003) found that stakeholder theory adopts the language of ethics and 
legitimacy to analyse how firms can behave against constituents and critically examine the aims 
of firms’ FP.
Furthermore, stakeholder theory examines how firms accomplish the objectives. FP is a crucial 
tool for many stakeholders in a firm because it tests how effectively a company uses its capital to 
profit. Thus, various stakeholders have started to realise that dealing with ownership structure 
power can protect their interests.
3.1.3. Resource dependence theory 
Lawrence and Lorsch firstly adopted resource dependence theory at year (1967). This theory linked 
with CG mechanisms, in particular, ownership structure and FP. From the viewpoint of this theory, 
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) assert that firms with limited resources need to connect with the 
external environment. Under this theory, CG is described as a cornerstone to the firm’s external 
environment. CG may benefit from external resources, such as financial resources and any relevant 
information of firm success (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003).
Furthermore, the ownership structure is used as a tool to enhance monitoring functions and 
provide successful resources (Hillman et al., 2009). Additionally, Udayasankar et al. (2005) sug-
gested that the assumptions, which are based on resource dependence theory, aim to improve 
board performance and is helpful in situations where the regulatory system is inefficient. In the 
same direction, Pfeffer and Salancik (2015) argued that resource dependence theory assists 
organisations in improving their performance by minimising their reliance on the external environ-
ment and contingencies, hence lowering costs. which may fundamentally assist their survival.
Resource dependence theory prefers to present outside directors on the board. Chou (2015) 
argued that external investors could scan resources from the external environment and bring 
them to firms’ financial objectives. Ownership investors have critical knowledge and skills that aid 
in developing relationships with many stakeholders (Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, 2006). Thus, 
firms are reliant on outside stakeholders to obtain critical resources. Frooman (1999) asserts that 
the company’s reliance on these external stakeholders stems from a power imbalance between 
the organisation and these parties. As a result, companies will try to manage the external 
environment to lessen the uncertainty associated with the purchase of vital resources. 
Accordingly, CGs serve mainly as external providers of resources, adapting their behaviour to 
organisational and environmental changes (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).
Monitoring and resource protection are two main aspects of the ownership structure function. 
Ownership investor monitors managers to ensure that their decisions and actions are consistent 
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with the expectations and interests of stakeholders. Further, the board of directors aid the own-
ership investors in safeguarding stakeholders’ interests (Pucheta-Martínez & Gallego-Álvarez, 
2019). In addition to monitoring tasks, resource dependence theory proposes that ownership 
structure offers access to resources that are not otherwise available. They contribute to sustained 
value development (Hillman et al., 2009).
3.2. Ownership structure and FP
The ownership structure means the percentage of shares owned by the various parties in equity 
capital. Every shareholder group has different economic motives and ways to grow their invest-
ment (Kao et al., 2019). Alabdullah (2018) has argued that different shareholders have different 
strategic decision-making powers, that may affect the performance of an organisation. The own-
ership structure and FP relationship became a trend in the accounting research (Alabdullah, 2018; 
Alkurdi et al., 2019; Al-Sa’eed, 2018; Buallay et al., 2017; Cornett et al., 2008; Din et al., 2021; 
Hartzell et al., 2014; Kao et al., 2019; Krivogorsky, 2006; Kuo et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2019; Riyadh 
et al., 2019; Vu et al., 2018; Yang & Shyu, 2019). Krivogorsky (2006) argued that ownership 
structure plays an essential role in FP and provides regulators with insights into how to improve 
CG practices, and facilitate an increase in the efficiency of firms. Moreover, Cornett et al. (2008) 
found a significant association between ownership structure and FP, and this relationship may be 
one of the strategies used to moderate agency conflict.
Additionally, Nikoskelainen & Wright (2007a) argued that because there is a separation between 
control and ownership in the firms, the performance or value of firms is frequently driven by 
ownership structure. More broadly, empirical studies in the relationship between ownership struc-
ture and FP have been undertaken by many researchers, academics, and policymakers. This study 
has thus focused on the three dimensions of ownership structure that are discussed below.
4. Empirical literature review and hypotheses development
4.1. Managerial ownership and FP
Earlier literature has shown that managerial ownership is an essential factor that mitigates 
agency conflicts and promotes performance (Kren & Kerr, 1997; Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998). 
The relationship between the proportion of managerial ownership and FP was first stated by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). They found that more control of equities by a manager may 
increase the firm’s performance, as it means that monetary rewards for the manager may 
be in better alignment. Following this, the major empirical studies on this subject show 
mixed results, and, in line with earlier findings, McConnell and Servaes (1990) argued that 
there is a monotonous relationship which implies that agency costs are increased or 
decreased depending on the level of management ownership. Kren and Kerr (1997) argued 
that increased management ownership is the crucial tool for improving FP. However, 
differing views on whether increased ownership by management can lead to improved 
performance results based on solving agency problems. Morck et al. (1988) found that 
managers’ control of equity may reduce the FP’s effectiveness. Because managers who have 
large ownership shares may be so dominant that they may not concern the shareholders’ 
interests, and they may be so rich that they do not intend to optimise their profit. Further, 
Acharya and Bisin (2009) conclude that FP increased with low managerial ownership levels 
while decreasing when the managerial ownership level increased. 
Few recent literary works have focused on an ownership structure in which the management 
holds shares (Bhutta & Hizmo, 2021; Riyadh et al., 2019; Inam bhutta et al., 2021). In the 
Jordanian context, Alabdullah (2018) found that an increase in ownership structure in non- 
financial firms, thus tending to an increase in market share that positively reflected firms’ 
performance. Such a result concurs with Al-Sa’eed’s (2018) results, who argued that man-
agerial ownership improves an FP based on a study conducted on manufacturing companies 
listed on the ASE. On the contrary, Alipour and Amjadi (2011) studied this relationship, and 
they concluded that managerial ownership has a significant and negative effect on a firm’s 
performance. Similarly, Warokka et al. (2012) concluded that managers’ low level of shares 
related negatively with FP. 
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Notwithstanding this, another group of studies, e.g., Hoang et al., 2017; Galego et al., 2019) 
agreed that managerial ownership related positively to FP. They argued that FP is increased 
when managers are an integral part of the company’s board. According to the above 
discussion, the study proposes the following hypotheses: 
H1: There is a negative association between managerial Ownership and ROA
H2: There is a negative association between managerial Ownership and TQ
4.2. Institutional ownership and FP
Institutional ownership represented the essential part of external CG. This type of ownership 
distinguishes itself from individuals by using financial analysis that motivates them to enhance 
FP (Velury & Jenkins, 2006). Furthermore, institutional investors who hold capital for a long time 
and have a higher level of knowledge and information processing; can strengthen their ability to 
understand the nature and scope of a firm’s performance, allowing them to exercise their mon-
itoring role (Lin & Fu, 2017). Bushee et al. (2014) argued that institutional ownership plays a vital 
role in strengthening CG practices. They have clear incentives and the power to track efficiently 
and compel managers to maximise the interests of shareholders. Along the same lines, Sharma 
(2004), in his conclusion, asserts that when the portion of institutional investors rises, the risk of 
fraud diminishes. These results indicate that institutional ownership would be critical in managing 
and disciplining management power and affecting reporting.
Recent studies have suggested that institutional ownership offers different incentives to 
control managers, according to the investment’s scope (Kao et al., 2019). In this regard, Liu 
et al. (2019) found that more existence of institutions in long-term returns were more likely than 
their more transient counterparts to monitor managers. Furthermore, Cho and Kim (2007) sug-
gested that institutional ownership enhances a firm’s performance and success by aiding inde-
pendent directors in their monitoring duties. Compatible with these findings, Piesse et al. (2007), 
Young et al. (2008), and Lin and Fu (2017) assert that institutional ownership works as a dynamic 
tool that helps firms to enhance their financial performance capabilities and sustainable success. 
Based on the views from the literature that are presented here, this study can develop the 
following hypotheses: 
H3: There is a positive association between institutional Ownership and ROA
H4: There is a positive association between institutional Ownership and TQ
4.3. Concentration ownership and FP
Concentrated ownership indicates the proportion of the stocks that some major shareholders own. 
It is also identified by the percentage of shares owned by the five largest shareholders (Singh & 
Gaur, 2009).
Two opposing arguments have discussed the relationship between the ownership concentration 
and the FP (Su et al., 2007). On one hand, Bhagat and Bolton (2019) assert that the monitoring 
argument pushes significant shareholders to minimise agency costs and increase overall firm 
performance, especially when firms suffer from a weak governance mechanism. Another argu-
ment is that a controlling shareholder can monitor significant decisions and appoint management. 
Based on this, concentrated investors work to maximise their interests at the expense of minority 
shareholders (Hu & Izumida, 2008).
This literature review has provided empirical evidence that the concentration of ownership and 
FP are investigated broadly. On the one hand, many previous studies have concluded that the 
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concentration of ownership is one of the things that used to enhancement the firms’ performances 
(Kao et al., 2019; Liu et al., 2019; Ma et al., 2010; Perrini et al., 2008) According to the results shown 
in these works, ownership concentration would minimise the agency costs. This is reflected in 
minimising the monitoring costs over management decisions and contributing to the increased 
efficiency and productivity of firms.
Lepore et al. (2017) have argued that the concentration of ownership will enhance a firm’s 
performance, especially in countries with inadequate protection of the investors; similarly, Alipour 
and Amjadi (2011) found that ownership concentration offers powerful incentives to control 
manager’s behaviour in order to reduce the problems resulting from agency conflict. Ma et al. 
(2010) found a similar outcome and points out that analysing the concentration of ownership and 
a firm’s output. They concluded that the concentration of ownership was reflected positively in 
minimising agency problems and increased the contributions to shareholder activism. The 
expenses of the agency costs will therefore also be minimised (Su et al., 2007). Using Asian 
countries, Heugens et al. (2009) performed their analysis to investigate the association between 
concentrated Ownership and FP. They discovered a positive correlation between the concentration 
of ownership and FP. Also, they clarified that the concentration of ownership was an important CG 
tool to protect minority shareholders. Other studies, such as Al-Thuneibat (2018), also noticed that 
firms are characterised by diffused ownership structures that do not produce a sustainable 
income. Further, for firms that work endogenously, It is expected that their selling of shares will 
increase the efficiency of their operations that reflected positively on the enhancement of the 
performance. With additional explanation, if a company’s ownership structure undergoes rapid 
and drastic changes, and the concentration of ownership is endogenous, it will experience 
increased profitability. Therefore, this study proposes the following hypotheses: 
H5: There is a positive association between ownership concentration and ROA
H6: There is a positive association between ownership concentration and TQ
5. Research design
5.1. Sample selection
To achieve the study’s objectives, we focused on Jordanian firms that listed in the first market. The 
annual financial reports and other related data from 2012 to 2018 were analysed. This study used 
a variety of sampling criteria to meet the required objective. Firstly, the second market was 
ignored. This exclusion is due to Jordan’s second market consisting of weak firms characterised 
by small size and medium; further, firms in the secondary market are not actively traded in the 
ASE, and their annual reports are often incomplete. Secondly, two firms listed in the first market 
that their annual reports were missing also avoided from the final sample. Table (1) showed that 
the study population consists of both firms listed in the first and second market with a total (180 
firms) . With excluding 117 firms listed on the second market in the ASE and excluded two firms. 
The final sample includes 61 firms, with 427 observations over the sample period. Further, 
a detailed classification of the firms shows that the final sample includes 26 firms that operate 
Table 1. Study sample
Population (all firms listed in ASE.) 180
Less:
Second market 117
Missing data (two firms) 2
Final study sample (first market) 61
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in the financial sector, 14 in the manufacturing sector, while 21 firms function in the services 
sector.
5.2. Model and measurement of variables
To meet the objectives of this study, this study developed the following multiple linear regression 
models:
ROAi; t ¼ aþ B1MOi; tþ B2INSi; tþ B3COi; tþ B4LIQi; tþ B5TAi; tþ B6AUDi; tþ B7SEi; tþ e 
TQi; t ¼ aþ B1MOi; tþ B2INSi; tþ B3COi; tþ B4LIQi; tþ B5TAi; tþ B6AUDi; tþ B7SEi; tþ e 
Where for firm i in year t
Based on the previous studies, the dependent, independent, and control variables are measured 
as follows:
5.2.1. Dependent variables: FP 
Firm’s FP: This study used a market FP proxy, TQ, and accounting FP proxy, ROA. These variables are 
commonly used in empirical studies. Some studies used ROA, such as (Alabdullah, 2018; Kao et al., 
2019; Liu et al., 2019; Vu et al., 2018; Zulkafli & Samad, 2007), while the market measure captured 
by TQ was widely used in many kinds of studies, such as (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Shah & Hussain, 
2012).
Based on a long-term market perspective, TQ is an effective instrument used to analyse a firm’s 
performance, indicating the present value of future cash flow using the information of both current 
and future performances (Aggarwal et al., 2011). Additionally, the TQ Ratio acts as a significant 
benchmark for the measurement of FP; it is a measure that expresses the potential growth in the 
firm’s assets. TQ calculated as a market capitalisation plus long-term debt, divided by the book 
value of total assets . The TQ increase indicates that the market values the firm as worthy of notice 
(Khamis et al., 2015). ROA is regarded as accounting-based performance since it refers to the firm’s 
asset basis’s profit. The ROA works as a tool that controls firms’ operating performance by 
allocating economic resources. To calculate ROA, we used an equation to divide the net income 
by the total assets deployed in the business over the reporting period.
5.2.2. Independent variables: ownership structure and control variables 
In line with previous literature, we consider the following categories of ownership structure:
● Managerial ownership represents the number of shares held by board members, and it is in 
relation to outstanding shares (Al-Sa’eed, 2018).
● Institutional ownership is calculated by the number of shares held by institutional investors 
against the total number of shares outstanding (Kao et al., 2019).
● Finally, the concentration of ownership is calculated as the percentage of shares held by the 
firms’ largest shareholder. It is defined as the percentage of shares held by the top five 
shareholders (Buallay et al., 2017).
Regarding the Control Variables, this study designs the following control variables that can 
potentially and theoretically affect FP. We employ variables such as the firm’s size, measured as 
the natural logarithm of total assets. The size will also determine whether the firm has sufficient 
capacity to organise its operating activities (Khamis et al., 2015). The second control variable is 
liquidity, which proxies the current ratio using current assets to current liabilities (Alkurdi & Mardini, 
2020). The third control variable is Big-4, a dummy variable, and it equals 1 if a Big-4 audit 
company audits the firm and 0 if not. Finally, the sector is used as a dummy variable, where 1 
refers to the financial sector, 2 means the manufacturing sector, and 3 means the services sector. 
Table 2 shows a summary of the variables that are employed in the model used in the study.
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6. Empirical results and discussion
6.1. Descriptive results
Descriptive statistics of the study variables are presented in Table 3, namely, mean, minimum, 
maximum, and standard deviation. Regarding the firm performance variables, the results show 
that the mean value of accounting performance with ROA is 5.394, with a maximum of 40.698 and 
a minimum of −13.176. These statistics indicate a wide variation in ROA, with a high standard 
deviation of 6.7 in the Jordanian context. These statistics allow us to conclude that there is 
a significant difference between firms. The mean value of TQ is 0.864, which means that the 
company is undervalued, which shows that the firms may not perform their market activities well. 
This conclusion is not consistent with Singh and Gaur (2009), who found that the TQ is more 
significant than one, which shows that the market values the firm as worthy.
In terms of ownership structure, results showed that there is diversity in ownership structure. The 
statistics demonstrate that the mean managerial ownership is 0.524, while the mean value of 
institutional ownership is 0.159. We can observe a considerable lowering of institutional ownership 
compared with managerial ownership. The highest mean value is about ownership concentration, 
with 0.80, with a maximum of 0.993. As a result, huge benefits can be generated from the concen-
tration of ownership into the five largest shareholdings. These benefits are related to monitoring 
managers’ decisions and regulating their interests with the shareholders’ needs. For the control 
variables, the average firm’s size is 8.035, and these statistics indicate that our sample was composed 
of large companies. Regarding the Big 4 auditors, we found that firms tend to be audited by the Big-4 
with a frequency of 57.3%. The sector variable statistics show that the majority of our sample is 
composed of financial companies. Thus, 42.6% of the sampled companies are in the financial sector.
Table 2. Measurement criteria
Variables Abbreviation Measurement
Dependent Variables: 




(1) dividing the net income by 
total assets
(2) Tobin’s q corresponds to mar-
ket capitalisation plus long- 
term debt divided by the book 
value of total assets
Independent Variables: 
A- Ownership Structures: 
1- Managerial Ownership 
2- Institutional Ownership 
3- concentration Ownership 
B-Control Variables: 
4- Liquidity 
5- Company Size 









(1) It is a percentage calculated 
by dividing shares hold by 
board members on total share 
outstanding.
(2) It represents the percentage 
resulted from dividing institu-
tional owners by total share 
outstanding.
(3) Represent percentage of 
shares owned by the top five 
shareholders
(4) Proxied by the current ratio, 
which represents the current 
assets on current liabilities.
(5) Proxied by the natural 
Logarithm of total assets.
(6) A dummy variable that 1 = 
Big-4 and 0 = Otherwise
(7) A dummy variable that 1 
means financial sector, 2 
means manufacturing sector, 
while 3 means Services sector.
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6.2. Data validity
Table 4 shows the correlation analysis. It reports the results of the Spearman Correlation, which 
was employed to investigate the relationship between ownership structure, FP, and control vari-
ables. Field (2009) identified that the correlation between independent variables should be no 
greater than 0.80. From Table 4, we concluded that the association between variables is generally 
at a low level. Moreover, there is no multicollinearity problem between the variables, as seen in the 
correlation matrix; it appears that all the correlations are less than 0.80.
Also, it can be used further test to detect the multicollinearity degree between the variables. We 
used the Variation Inflation Factor (VIF) test for multicollinearity problems; further, Tolerance 
(calculated as 1/VIF) is often used to check for multicollinearity. If VIF is higher than 10, then 
multicollinearity is present (Neter et al., 1996). The tolerance values are not less than 0.1. Hence, 
Table 5 indicates that there is no existence of a multicollinearity problem in the regression model.
6.3. The regression results
This study used balanced panel data of the firms that listed in the first market. With a total of 61 
firms for 7 years. Hence, the regression output is shown in Table 6. In general, FP measures seem 
to have a good fit, as proposed in Table 6. It explains acceptable percentages of the effect of 
study-independent variables on FP using ROA with an adjusted R2 of 36.02%. While TQ 31.93%. 
From the agency theory context, prior studies argued that ownership structure and FP are due to 
innovation and competitive advantage. Thus, a higher ownership structure may lower information 
asymmetry and higher transparency, and push managers to promote FP (Kao et al., 2019). 
Table 4. Correlation matrix
ROA TQ MO INS CO LIQ TA AUD SE
ROA 1.000
TQ −0.060 1.000
MO 0.131 0.053 1.000
INS 0.216 −0.007 0.112 1.000
CO 0.174 −0.032 0.533 −0.155 1.000
LIQ 0.463 0.024 0.180 0.384 0.107 1.000
TA −0.205 −0.567 −0.066 0.334 −0.128 −0.210 1.000
AUD −0.136 −0.078 0.055 0.396 0.033 −0.023 0.481 1.000
SE 0.438 −0.096 0.052 −0.060 0.016 0.382 −0.299 −0.313 1
Note: This table explores the correlation analysis of the study variables. The p-value significant level shows * = 10%, ** = 
5% and *** represent 1% 
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Following is an explanation of regression results for accounting and market FP indicators with the 
ownership structure.
6.4. Discussion
Table 6 explores the association between ownership structure and ROA as accounting perfor-
mance indicators. In terms of the MO, Table 6 shows the negative and significant association with 
ROA at (p < 0.05) supporting H1. This means that managers’ ownership of firms with a higher ROA 
is conscious of business challenges. The extent of this is linked to agency theory as it suggests that 
when managers possess a significant proportion of the company, they are expected to operate in 
their best interests. It is also consistent with what was found by researchers like (Alipour & Amjadi, 
2011). Indeed, the MO reflects opportunistic behaviour that affects employee competencies and 
a firm’s ability to recruit and retain talented people to enhance its performance (Acharya & Bisin, 
2009; Alipour & Amjadi, 2011; Khamis et al., 2015). Based on the Jordanian context, Mohammed 
(2018) arrived to the same conclusion, and asserted that MO exploited opportunistic activities to 
serve their interest, which eventually results in the increase the agency costs level. On the 
contrary, this conclusion is not consistent with other Jordanian studies, such as Dakhlallh et al. 
(2020) who asserts that managerial investors with a high amount of shares may act well in term to 
maximise the opportunities of productivity and then increase the level of FP. Furthermore, Al- 
Sa’eed (2018) asserts that MO is a good predictor of FP. From an agency theory perspective, he 
admits that MO is a valuable tool used to improve FP. In the same direction, Alabdullah’s (2018) 
conclusion found that managerial ownership is related positively to FP. Additionally, Table 6 
showed that MO failed to affect TQ, which leaves us with rejecting H2. These results interpreted 
that managerial investors behave opportunistically and ignore the importance of TQ for share-
holders (Alabdullah, 2018; Perrini et al., 2008).
Furthermore, Table 6 shows the results of the association between INS and ROA. The table 
shows that the coefficient is positive (p < 0.01), So accepting H3. This conclusion supports the 
notion that INS improves a firm’s performance from two perspectives. On one side, it causes 
outside block shareholders to control the managers’ actions; on the other, it will minimise the issue 
of free riders, which emerges from the lack of control by shareholders. This result is in line with 
those (Sharma, 2004; Young et al., 2008).
In addition, INS possesses the experience and technical ability that reflected positively on the 
firm’s success. Some Jordanian studies assert that INS works to enhance FP, such as (Dakhlallh 
et al., 2019). Thus, this study confirms that INS influences the FP. This is due to INS works on 
reducing agency costs, providing a wealth of experience in dealing with managerial opportunism. 
Additionally, INS helps firms quickly access superior technical, managerial talents, and financial 
resources and obtain various government investment benefits. By referring to the TQ. In Table 6, 
we observe that INS shows a positive relationship with TQ at (p < 0.05), so accept H4. From these 
results, there is confirmation that INO plays a crucial role in enhancing TQ. This means institutional 
investors working to invest in employee competencies will likely enhance their ability to improve 
future performance and organisational processes, products, services, and market performance. In 
other words, large institutional investors have many shares in the firm and can efficiently monitor 
the managers’ activities. This conclusion is consistent with that of (Kao et al., 2019). The main 
Jordanian studies confirm this conclusion is what found by Jarbou et al. (2018), Rashid (2020). 
They concluded that the presence of INS in a company’s capital structure is perceived as 
a favourable event. Further, they assert that directions of the ownership structure dimensions 
and firms’ performance reflected positively on the firm's success. This is due to the CG iS exercise 
effective monitoring of management decisions, especially with INS existence. Contrary, Al- 
Zaidyeen and AL-Rawash (2015) attend to the negative impact of the INS on FP. And argued 
that appropriate decisions about the firms' performance are not stable because INS does not work 
with firm's interest.
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Further, this study explains the relationship between CO and ROA. The results show a positive 
relationship between these variables at (p < 0.01), with accepting H5. When the ownership is 
concentrated among large investors, they are motivated to use assets to measure good financial 
results that will positively boost their returns. In addition to this, concentrated ownership will lead 
them to enhance their feeling that the company represents their particular investment, and 
through this, they will be pushed to work together to enhance the firm’s performance; by control-
ling and influencing financial policies to ensure sustained success in the long run. However, these 
results appear to be in line with the findings (Kao et al., 2019; Liu et al., 2019; Ma et al., 2010).
Furthermore, CO is more diligent than the minority shareholders due to their monitoring skills, 
which puts them into a place that distinguishes them from the minority shareholder. This result 
is consistent with what has been found in some other literature, e.g. (Khamis et al., 2015). 
Dakhlallh et al. (2019a) indicated that concentrated ownership has a positive and significant 
impact on FP in the Jordanian context. Furthermore, there is other various previous studies were 
conducted on the Jordan environment. Saleh et al. (2017), found that the same conclusion and 
argued that the large shareholders would impose their power to strengthen their positions, 
thereby preferring enhanced FP. On the contrary, Jarbou et al. (2018) concluded that concen-
trated ownership has a negative relationship to the banks’ performance, and the concentrated 
investors may abuse their authority. Additionally, Table 6 indicates that CO has a positive 
relationship with TQ, thus accepted H6. This confirmed that concentrated investors focus on 
strategic capital-market decisions that may help to enhance the market value of firm front 
compactors. This conclusion is consistent with Zeitun and Gang Tian (2007). They assert that TQ 
is an essential indicator of the firms’ success and efficiency in the Jordanian equity market. 
While Mohammed (2018) found the opposite relationship indicates that ownership concentra-
tion is negatively related with firm performance
Finally, TA showed a negative relationship with ROA and TQ. Table 6 shows the positive relationship 
of LIQ with ROA but an insignificant one with TQ. We notice that the size of the business is related to 
the decreasing financial reporting quality. The case clarifies that a larger business size raises its 
operational risk, contributing to accounting discretion for managers in order to deceive investors (Al- 
Sa’eed, 2018). Further, this conclusion is not consistent with Cho and Kim (2007), who found that it is 
easier for large firms to raise returns internally and obtain funds from outside sources to improve their 
FP. Regarding AUD, this does not affect FP. Finally, SE shows a positive relationship with ROA.
6.5. Robustness test
Our data are balanced panel data. This study uses robustness tests to assess whether there is an 
existence of variance between regressions. To decide between fixed or random effects, we run 
a Hausman test. It tests whether the unique errors are correlated with the regressors; the null hypothesis 
is that they are not. The Hausman test runs a fixed-effect model, saves the estimates, then runs 
a random model to save the estimates, then performs the test. The p-value is significant = 
0.0000 <0.05. We used the fixed effect regression to reduce the standard error as suggested by the 
Hausman test result. Fixed effect regression will treat any omitted variable bias, which is one of the 
endogeneity problems. It also mitigates any possible multicollinearity (Winship & Western, 2016; 
Wooldridge, 2010). From Table 7, we find that the results remain consistent with the main model 6. 
Both coefficients and significant levels are remaining in the same direction, suggesting that our model is 
valid.
7. Summary and conclusion
This study investigates the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance using 
accounting FP indicator ROA and a market FP indicator TQ. We used a sample of 61 Jordanian firms 
listed in the first market on the ASE from 2012 to 2018. The conclusion implies a negative and 
significant relationship between MO and ROA. It relies on the fact that managers work on optimising 
self-interest without caring about other shareholders’ needs. This can be reflected negatively on 
firms’ success and the level of sustainable development. On the contrary, MO does not affect TQ, and 
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this means that when managers hold a very significant number of a firm’s shares and have control of 
the decision-making process. It means that managers ignore the firm’s market value and focus on 
their interest to harm firms’ interests related to enhancing the market value.
Based on the empirical argument, INS is an important investor in Jordanian firms. This study has 
confirmed that ROA and TQ are affected by INS. Institutional investors who are economically more 
robust play a significant role in enhancing a firm’s performance. They have valuable knowledge 
and expertise with which to help establish relationships with various stakeholders. Thus, they have 
good incentives to reduce management manipulation of accounting items and monitor managers’ 
decisions of investors’ needs. Additionally, they play a significant role in monitoring the financial 
reporting process to increase the FP level.
Additionally, results appear to demonstrate a positive association between CO and both ROA 
and TQ. CO helps to enhance FP, especially in a weak investor protection environment. 
Furthermore, CO is used to alleviate the agency problem that may support the owners’ willingness 
to control a firm’s efficiency. Furthermore, this study concludes that CO is related to a higher level 
of firm performance in emerging economies. It is a tool for the protection of minority shareholders. 
Further, CO is used to mitigate managerial expropriation, resulting in enhanced performance based 
on the alignment of the existing argument.
Furthermore, this study found a significant association between CO and TQ. This relies on high 
levels of CON, which can build on reduce risk related to financial outcomes. Further, leading 
significant shareholders shift a firm’s capital to a sustainable level, and thus businesses become 
more profitable. The advantages of CO, such as controlling and regulating decision, can provide 
financial success. This study has found that INS and CO have a positive relationship with both 
accounting and market performance measurers from the empirical results. This conclusion asserts 
that the agency problem is reduced. Moreover, effective monitoring contributes to minimise the 
failure of internal control mechanisms.
Based on the above conclusions, the findings of this study have the following theoretical 
implications. First, the results show a significantly positive association between INS and both 
accounting and market-based FP. This assures us that the monitoring value of INS tends to be 
the most significant part of the ownership structure, mainly where there are weaker CG practices. 
Thus, the findings of this study may have practical contributions that suggest that the regulators 
and authorities should require all listed companies to increase their INO percentage to enhance 
the Jordanian firm’s performance. Second, Jordan is seen as a developing economy, with CG 
structures still at an evolving level. So this study recommended reviewing the corporate govern-
ance code yearly. This review may increase the role of ownership structure in mitigating manage-
ment expropriation, and as a result, centralised control will help minimise the agency conflict. 
Third, the study’s results revealed several critical data that could benefit the firm’s management, 
policymakers and regulators. For example, to enhance the level of FP, especially TQ, the firm’s 
management may encourage reconstructing their board of directors and ownership structure. This 
helps to create them to possess various characteristics that enhance the market PF. In addition, 
regulators and policymakers can develop rules and codes to guide the ownership structure to 
improve the level of FP. Finally, based on MO and accounting, FP’s negative association. This may 
point toward a lack of management concern for the firm’s sustainable profitability. This study 
contributes to giving authorities and regulators a comprehensive understanding of the protection 
of stakeholder rights and monitoring opportunistic managerial behaviour. Moreover, help decision- 
makers in the firms to increase their attention towards enhancing and sustaining the firm’s 
performance.
The findings of this study have many theoretical limitations. First, regarding the FP measure such 
as TQ, the results show little impact of ownership structure on TQ, especially managerial owner-
ship. Thus, this study responds to calls for a new investigation focusing on other ownership 
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structure types, including governmental and family ownership. These types may be important 
factors that may affect the firms’ success, such as enhance the firm’s market share. Second, this 
study focused only on one aspect of corporate governance, that is, ownership structure. Thus, the 
research suggests conducting further studies to include different corporate governance character-
istics such as board attributes, namely board committees and board expertise. Third, the present 
study covers the period to the year 2018 only. Future researches may be carried out by including 
years 2019–2021 to provide more robust pictures. Fourth, the current study shows that agency 
theory provides little explaining the link between MO with TQ into first market firms. This study 
recommends categorising markets to financial or non-financial firms that may strengthen the role 
of agency theory in FP. Despite these limitations, this study enhances the extant studies from 
many aspects. However, this study opens the door for future studies to use board gender as 
a moderator variable in the relationship between ownership structure and FP using another 
regression analysis such as a fixed-effect estimator. In addition, future research may focus on 
the relationship between managerial ability and FP using MENA regions.
Funding








1 Accounting Department, Faculty of Administrative and 
Financial Sciences, Assistant Professor, Aqaba University 
of Technology, Jordan. 
2 Accounting Department, Lecture, School of Business, 
University of Jordan, Jordan. 
3 Faculty of Administrative and Financial Sciences, 
Assistant Professor, Business Administration, Aqaba 
University of Technology, Jordan. 
4 Accounting Department, Lecturer, the University of 
Westminster, UK. 
Citation information 
Cite this article as: Ownership structure’s effect on finan-
cial performance: An empirical analysis of Jordanian listed 
firms, Amneh Alkurdi, Amneh hamad, Hussam Thneibat & 
Mahmoud Elmarzouky, Cogent Business & Management 
(2021), 8: 1939930.
References
Abed, S., Al-Attar, A., & Suwaidan, M. (2012). Corporate 
governance and earnings management: Jordanian 
evidence. International Business Research, 5(1), 
216–225. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ibr.v5n1p216
Acharya, V. V., & Bisin, A. (2009). Managerial hedging, 
equity ownership, and firm value. The RAND Journal 
of Economics, 40(1), 47–77. https://doi.org/10.1111/j. 
1756-2171.2008.00055.x
Aggarwal, R., Erel, I., Ferreira, M., & Matos, P. (2011). Does 
governance travel around the world? Evidence from 
institutional investors. Journal of Financial Economics, 
100(1), 154–181. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco. 
2010.10.018
Alabdullah, T. T. Y. (2018). The relationship between 
ownership structure and firm financial performance: 
evidence from Jordan. Benchmarking: An 
International Journal, 25(1), 319–333. https://doi.org/ 
10.1108/BIJ-04-2016-0051
Alhababsah, S. (2019). Ownership structure and audit 
quality: An empirical analysis considering ownership 
types in Jordan. Journal of International Accounting, 
Auditing and Taxation, 35(2), 71–84. https://doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2019.05.006
Alipour, M., & Amjadi, H. (2011). The effect of ownership 
structure on corporate performance of listed com-
panies in Tehran stock exchange: An empirical evi-
dence of Iran. International Journal of Business and 
Social Science, 2(13), 49–55.
Alkurdi, A., Hussainey, K., Tahat, Y., & Aladwan, M. (2019). 
The impact of corporate governance on risk disclo-
sure: Jordanian evidence. Academy of Accounting 
and Financial Studies Journal, 23(1), 71–84.
Alkurdi, A., & Mardini, G. H. (2020). The impact of owner-
ship structure and the board of directors’ composi-
tion on tax avoidance strategies: Empirical evidence 
from Jordan. Journal of Financial Reporting and 
Accounting, 18(4), 795–812. https://doi.org/10.1108/ 
JFRA-01-2020-0001
Almahrog, Y., Ali Aribi, Z., & Arun, T. (2018). Earnings 
management and corporate social responsibility: UK 
evidence. Journal of Financial Reporting and 
Accounting, 16(2), 311–332. https://doi.org/10.1108/ 
JFRA-11-2016-0092
Al-Sa’eed, M. (2018). The impact of ownership structure 
and dividends on firm’s performance: Evidence from 
manufacturing companies listed on the amman 
stock exchange. Australasian Accounting, Business 
and Finance Journal, 12(3), 107–126. http://dx.doi. 
org/10.14453/aabfj.v12i3.7
Al-Shattarat, W. K., Al-Shattarat, B. K., & Hamed, R. 
(2018). Do dividends announcements signal future 
earnings changes for Jordanian firms?. Journal of 
Financial Reporting and Accounting, 16(3), 417–442. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/JFRA-03-2017-0021
Al-Thuneibat, A. (2018). The relationship between the 
ownership structure, capital structure and 
performance. Journal of Accounting, Business and 
Management (JABM), 25(25), 1–20. https://doi.org/10. 
31966/jabminternational.v1i25.326
Al-Zaidyeen, K. A. A., & AL-Rawash, S. Z. (2015). The effect 
of ownership structure on corporate performance of 
listed companies in amman stock exchange: an 
empirical evidence of Jordan. International Journal of 
Managerial Studies and Research, 3(5), 41–49.
Bataineh, H. (2021). The impact of ownership structure on 
dividend policy of listed firms in Jordan. Cogent 
Business & Management, 8(1), 863175. https://doi. 
org/10.1080/23311975.2020.1863175
Beatty, A., & Harris, D. (1998). The effects of taxes, agency 
costs and information asymmetry on earnings man-
agement: A comparison of public and private firms. 
The Review of Accounting Studies, 4(3/4), 299–326. 
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009642403312
Bhagat, S., & Bolton, B. (2019). Corporate governance and 
firm performance: the sequel. Journal of Corporate 
Alkurdi et al., Cogent Business & Management (2021), 8: 1939930                                                                                                                                   
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2021.1939930
Page 18 of 21
Finance, 58(1), 142–168. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. 
jcorpfin.2019.04.006
Bhutta, N., & Hizmo, A. (2021). Do minorities pay more for 
mortgages?. The Review of Financial Studies, 34(2), 
763–789. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaa047
Buallay, A., Hamdan, A., & Zureigat, Q. (2017). Corporate 
governance and firm performance: Evidence from 
Saudi Arabia. Australasian Accounting, Business and 
Finance Journal, 11(1), 78–98. https://doi.org/10. 
14453/aabfj.v11i1.6
Bushee, B. J., Carter, M. E., & Gerakos, J. (2014). 
Institutional investor preferences for corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms. Journal of Management 
Accounting Research, 26(2), 123–149. https://doi.org/ 
10.2308/jmar-50550
Cho, S., & Kim, J. (2007). Outside directors, ownership 
structure and firm profitability in Korea. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 15(2), 239–250. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00557.x
Chou, T. K. (2015). Insider ownership and firm perfor-
mance: A resource dependence perspective. Journal 
of Applied Business Research (JABR), 31(3), 861–870. 
https://doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v31i3.9223
Cornett, M. M., Marcus, A. J., & Tehraniam, H. (2008). 
Corporate governance and pay-for-performance: the 
impact of earnings management. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 87(2), 357–375. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. 
jfineco.2007.03.003
Dakhlallh, M. M., Mohd Rashid, N. M. N. N., 
Abdullah, W. A. W., & Dakhlallh, A. M. (2019). The 
mediating effect of the managerial ownership 
towards the influence of the board of directors on 
the firm performance among jordanian public 
shareholders companies. Journal of Environmental 
Treatment Techniques, 7(4), 760–767. http://dx.doi. 
org/10.47750/cibg.2021.27.02.011
Dakhlallh, M. M., Rashid, N., Abdullah, W. A. W., & Al 
Shehab, H. J. (2020). Ownership Structure and Firm 
performance: evidence from Jordan. Journal of 
Contemporary Issues in Business and Government, 27 
(2), 80–90. https://doi.org/10.5373/JARDCS/V12I1/ 
20201005
Din, S. U., Arshad Khan, M., Khan, M. J., & Khan, M. Y. 
(2021). Ownership structure and corporate financial 
performance in an emerging market: A dynamic 
panel data analysis. International Journal of 
Emerging Markets, (ahead–of–print), forthcomimg. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOEM-03-2019-0220
Emanuel, D., Wong, J., & Wong, N. (2003). Efficient con-
tracting and accounting. Accounting & Finance, 43(2), 
149–166. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-629X.00086
Fama, E., & Jensen, M. (1983). Separation of ownership 
and control. The Journal of Law & Economics, 26(2), 
301–325. https://doi.org/10.1086/467037
Field, A. (2009). Discovering statistics using SPSS: book 
plus code for E version of text. SAGE Publications 
Limited, Third edition. (p.896).
Freeman, R. E. (1984). Strategic Management. In 
A Stakeholder Approach. Boston: Pitman. MA.P.25
Frooman, J. (1999). Stakeholder influence strategies. 
Academy of Management Review, 24(2), 191–205. 
https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1999.1893928
Galego, A., Mira, N., & Silva, J. V. (2019). Ownership, pro-
ductivity and firms’ life-cycle. European Journal of 
Family Business, 8(2), 139–150. https://doi.org/10. 
24310/ejfbejfb.v8i2.5228
Grougiou, V., Leventis, S., Dedoulis, E., & Owusu-Ansah, S. 
(2014). Corporate social responsibility and earnings 
management in US banks. Accounting Forum, 38(3), 
155–169. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2014.05.003
Hartzell, J. C., Sun, L., & Titman, S. (2014). Institutional 
investors as monitors of corporate diversification 
decisions: evidence from real estate investment 
trusts. Journal of Corporate Finance, 25(2), 61–72. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.10.006
Heugens, P. P., Van Essen, M., & van Oosterhout, J. H. 
(2009). Meta-analyzing ownership concentration and 
firm performance in Asia: towards a more 
fine-grained understanding. Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management, 26(3), 481–512. https://doi.org/10. 
1007/s10490-008-9109-0
Hillman, A. J., & Dalziel, T. (2003). Boards of directors and 
firm performance: integrating agency and resource 
dependence perspectives. Academy of Management 
Review, 28(3), 383–396. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr. 
2003.10196729
Hillman, A. J., Withers, M. C., & Collins, B. J. (2009). 
Resource dependence theory: A review. Journal of 
Management, 35(6), 1404–1427. https://doi.org/10. 
1177/0149206309343469
Hoang, L. T., Nguyen, C. C., & Hu, B. (2017). Ownership struc-
ture and firm performance improvement: does it matter 
in the Vietnamese stock market?. Economic Papers: 
A Journal of Applied Economics and Policy, 36(4), 
416–428. https://doi.org/10.1111/1759-3441.12185
Hu, Y., & Izumida, S. (2008). Ownership concentration and 
corporate performance: A causal analysis with 
Japanese panel data. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 16(4), 38–342. https://doi.org/ 
10.1111/j.1467-8683.2008.00690.x
Inam Bhutta, A., Sheikh, M. F., Munir, A., Naz, A., & Saif, I. 
(2021). Managerial ability and firm performance: 
evidence from an emerging market. Cogent Business 
& Management, 8(1), 1879449. https://doi.org/10. 
1080/23311975.2021.1879449
Jackling, B., & Johl, S. (2009). Board structure and firm 
performance: evidence from India’s top companies. 
Corporate Governance, 17(4), 492–509. https://doi. 
org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2009.00760.x
Jarbou, L. S., Abu-Serdaneh, J., & LATIF MAHD, O. A. 
(2018). Ownership structure impact on Jordanian 
Banks’ financial performance. Asian Journal of 
Accounting & Governance, 9(2), 1–10. https://doi.org/ 
10.17576/AJAG-2018-09-01
Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: man-
agerial behavior, agency costs and ownership 
structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 44(4), 
111–124. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76) 
90026-X
Kao, M., Hodgkinson, L., & Jaafar, A. (2019). Ownership 
structure, board of directors and firm performance: 
Evidence from Taiwan. Corporate Governance, 19(1), 
189–216. https://doi.org/10.1108/CG-04-2018-0144
Khamis, R., Hamdan, A. M., & Elali, W. (2015). The relation-
ship between ownership structure dimensions and 
corporate performance: Evidence from Bahrain. 
Australasian Accounting, Business and Finance Journal, 
9(4), 38–56. https://doi.org/10.14453/aabfj.v9i4.4
Khan, I., & Zahid, S. N. (2020). The impact of Shari’ah and 
corporate governance on Islamic banks perfor-
mance: Evidence from Asia. International Journal of 
Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management, 
13(3), 483–501. https://doi.org/10.1108/IMEFM-01- 
2019-0003
Kiel, G. C., & Nicholson, G. J. (2003). Board composition 
and corporate performance: How the Australian 
experience informs contrasting theories of corporate 
governance. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 11(3), 189–205. https://doi.org/10.1111/ 
1467-8683.00318
Alkurdi et al., Cogent Business & Management (2021), 8: 1939930                                                                                                                                   
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2021.1939930                                                                                                                                                       
Page 19 of 21
Kren, L., & Kerr, J. L. (1997). The effects of outside direc-
tors and board shareholdings on the relation 
between chief executive compensation and firm 
performance. Accounting and Business Research, 27 
(4), 297–309. https://doi.org/10.1080/00014788. 
1997.9729556
Krivogorsky, V. (2006). Ownership, board structure, and 
performance in continental Europe. The International 
Journal of Accounting, 41(2), 176–197. https://doi. 
org/10.1016/j.intacc.2006.04.002
Kuo, K., Lu, W., & Dinh, T. (2020). Firm performance and 
ownership structure: dynamic network data envelop-
ment analysis approach. Managerial and Decision 
Economics, 41(4), 608–623. https://doi.org/10.1002/ 
mde.3124
Kyereboah-Coleman, A., & Biekpe, N. (2006). The rela-
tionship between board size, board composition, CEO 
duality and firm performance: experience from 
Ghana. Corporate Ownership and Control, 4(2), 
114–122. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv4i2p11
Lawrence, P., & Lorsch, J. (1967). Organization and envir-
onment. Division of Research, Harvard Business 
School.
Lepore, L., Paolone, F., Pisano, S., & Alvino, F. (2017). A 
cross-country comparison of the relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm perfor-
mance: Does judicial system efficiency matter?. 
Corporate Governance, 17(2), 321–340. https://doi. 
org/10.1108/CG-03-2016-0049
Lin, Y. R., & Fu, X. M. (2017). Does institutional ownership 
influence firm performance? evidence from China. 
International Review of Economics & Finance, 49(1), 
17–57. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2017.01.021
Liu, T., Zhang, Y., & Liang, D. (2019). Can ownership 
structure improve environmental performance in 
Chinese manufacturing firms? the moderating effect 
of financial performance. Journal of Cleaner 
Production, 225(1), 58–71. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. 
jclepro.2019.03.267
Ma, S., Naughton, T., & Tian, G. (2010). Ownership and 
ownership concentration: Which is important in 
determining the performance of China’s listed firms?. 
Accounting & Finance, 50(4), 871–897. https://doi.org/ 
10.1111/j.1467-629X.2010.00353.x
Makhlouf, M. H., Laili, N. H. B., & Basah, M. Y. A. (2014). Board 
of directors characteristics and firms performance 
among Jordanian firms, proposing conceptual 
framework. OECD Journal on Development, 2(4), 18–23.
Mardnly, Z., Mouselli, S., & Abdulraouf, R. (2018). 
Corporate governance and firm performance: An 
empirical evidence from Syria. International Journal 
of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and 
Management, 11(4), 591–607. https://doi.org/10. 
1108/IMEFM-05-2017-0107
McConnell, J. J., & Servaes, H. (1990). Additional evidence 
on equity ownership and corporate value. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 27(2), 595–612. https://doi.org/ 
10.1016/0304-405X(90)90069-C
Mohammed, A. M. (2018). The impact of audit committee 
characteristics on firm performance: evidence from 
Jordan. Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies 
Journal, 22(5), 1–7.
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988). Management 
ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 20(2), 293–315. https:// 
doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(88)90048-7
Neter, J., Kutner, M., Wasserman, W., & Nachtsheim, C. 
(1996). Applied Linear Statistical Models (4th ed). 
McGraw-Hill/Irwin.
Nikoskelainen, E., & Wright, M. (2007a). The impact of 
corporate governance mechanisms on value increase 
in leveraged buyouts. Journal of Corporate Finance, 
13(4), 511–537. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin. 
2007.04.002
Nikoskelainen, E., & Wright, M. (2007b). The impact of 
corporate governance mechanisms on value increase 
in leveraged buyouts”. Journal of Corporate Finance, 
13(4), 511–537. https://doi.org/10.1017/j.jcorpfin. 
2007.04.002
Omran, M. M., Bolbol, A., & Fatheldin, A. (2008). Corporate 
governance and firm performance in Arab equity 
markets: does ownership concentration matter?. 
International Review of Law and Economics, 28(1), 
32–45. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2007.12.001
Perrini, F., Rossi, G., & Rovetta, B. (2008). Does ownership 
structure affect performance? evidence from the 
Italian market. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 16(4), 312–325. https://doi.org/ 
10.1111/j.1467-8683.2008.00695.x
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. (2015). External Control of 
Organizations—Resource Dependence Perspective 
(pp. 373–388). Routledge.
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (2003). The external control of 
organizations: A resource dependence perspective. 
Stanford University Press.
Phillips, R., Freeman, R. E., & Wicks, A. C. (2003). What 
stakeholder theory is not. Business Ethics Quarterly, 
13(4), 479–502. https://doi.org/10.5840/ 
beq200313434
Piesse, J., Filatotchev, I., & Lien, Y. C. (2007). Corporate 
governance in family-controlled firms in Taiwan. 
International Review of Economics, 54(1), 176–193. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12232-007-0009-2
Pucheta-Martínez, M. C., & Gallego-Álvarez, I. (2019). An 
international approach of the relationship between 
board attributes and the disclosure of corporate 
social responsibility issues. Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Environmental Management, 26(3), 
612–627. https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.1707
Rashid, M. M. (2020). Ownership structure and firm per-
formance: The mediating role of board 
characteristics. Corporate Governance, 20(4), 
719–737. https://doi.org/10.1108/CG-02-2019-0056
Riyadh, H. A., Sukoharsono, E. G., & Alfaiza, S. A. (2019). 
The impact of corporate social responsibility disclo-
sure and board characteristics on corporate 
performance. Cogent Business & Management, 6(1), 
1647917. https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2019. 
1647917
Saleh, A. S., Halili, E., Zeitun, R., & Salim, R. (2017). Global 
financial crisis, ownership structure and firm financial 
performance: an examination of listed firms in 
Australia. Studies in Economics and Finance, 34(4), 
447–465. https://doi.org/10.1108/SEF-09-2016-0223
Shah, S. Z. A., & Hussain, Z. (2012). Impact of ownership 
structure on firm performance evidence from 
non-financial listed companies at karachi stock 
exchange. International Research Journal of Finance 
and Economics, 84(3), 6–13.
Sharma, V. D. (2004). Board of director characteristics, 
institutional ownership, and fraud: evidence from 
Australia. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 23 
(2), 105–117. https://doi.org/10.2308/aud.2004.23.2. 
105
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate 
governance. The Journal of Finance, 52(2), 737–783. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x
Singh, D. A., & Gaur, A. S. (2009). Business group affilia-
tion, firm governance, and firm performance: evi-
dence from China and India. Corporate Governance: 
An International Review, 17(4), 411–425. https://doi. 
org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2009.00750.x
Alkurdi et al., Cogent Business & Management (2021), 8: 1939930                                                                                                                                   
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2021.1939930
Page 20 of 21
Siregar, S. V., & Utama, S. (2008). Type of earnings man-
agement and the effect of ownership structure, firm 
size, and corporate-governance practices: evidence 
from Indonesia. The International Journal of 
Accounting, 43(1), 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. 
intacc.2008.01.001
Su, Y., Xu, D., & Phan, P. H. (2007). Principal-principal 
conflict in governance of the Chinese public 
corporation. Management and Organization Review, 4 
(1), 17–38. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-8784.2007. 
00090.x
Udayasankar, K., Das, S. S., & Krishnamurti, C. (2005). 
“Integrating multiple theories of corporate govern-
ance: A multi-country empirical study.” In K. M. Weaver 
(ed.), Proceedings of the 65th academy of management 
annual meeting, Honolulu, 4, No. 1, 1–6.
Vafeas, N., & Theodorou, E. (1998). The relationship 
between board structure and firm performance in 
the UK. The British Accounting Review, 30(4), 
383–407. https://doi.org/10.1006/bare.1998.0075
Velury, U., & Jenkins, D. S. (2006). Institutional ownership 
and the quality of earnings. Journal of Business 
Research, 59(9), 1043–1051. https://doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.jbusres.2006.05.001
Vu, M., Phan, T., & Le, N. (2018). Relationship between 
board ownership structure and firm financial perfor-
mance in transitional economy: the case of Vietnam. 
Research in International Business and Finance, 45(2), 
512–528. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2017.09.002
Warokka, A., Abdullah, H. H., & Duran, J. J. (2012). 
Ownership structures and firm performance: does 
East Asian corporate governance’s recovery work. 
World Review of Business Research, 2(1), 18–35.
Winship, C., & Western, B. (2016). Multicollinearity and 
model misspecification. Sociological Science, 27(3), 
627–649. https://doi.org/10.15195/v3.a27
Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). Econometric analysis of cross 
section and panel data. MIT press.
Yang, C. S., & Shyu, J. (2019). Do institutional investor and 
group, firm and time effects matter in enterprise 
performance in the corporate life cycle?. Cogent 
Business & Management, 6(1), 1606473. https://doi. 
org/10.1080/23311975.2019.1606473
Yasser, Q., Mamun, A., & Hook, M. (2017). The impact of 
ownership structure on financial reporting quality in 
the east. International Journal of Organizational 
Analysis, 25(2), 178–197. https://doi.org/10.1108/ 
IJOA-08-2015-0894
Young, N., Peng, W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, D., & Jiang, Y. 
(2008). Corporate governance in emerging econo-
mies: A review of the principal–principal perspective. 
Journal of Management Studies, 45(1), 196–220. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2007.00752.x
Zeitun, R., & Gang Tian, G. (2007). Does ownership affect 
a firm’s performance and default risk in Jordan?. 
Corporate Governance, 7(1), 66–82. https://doi.org/10. 
1108/14720700710727122
Zulkafli, A. H., & Samad, F. A. (2007). Corporate govern-
ance and performance of banking firms: evidence 
from Asian emerging markets. Advances in Financial 
Economics, 12(3), 49–74. https://doi.org/10.1016/ 
S1569-3732(07)12003-X
© 2021 The Author(s). This open access article is distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution (CC-BY) 4.0 license. 
You are free to:  
Share — copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format.  
Adapt — remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially.  
The licensor cannot revoke these freedoms as long as you follow the license terms.  
Under the following terms:  
Attribution — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made.  
You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use.  
No additional restrictions  
You may not apply legal terms or technological measures that legally restrict others from doing anything the license permits.
Cogent Business & Management (ISSN: 2331-1975) is published by Cogent OA, part of Taylor & Francis Group.  
Publishing with Cogent OA ensures:  
• Immediate, universal access to your article on publication  
• High visibility and discoverability via the Cogent OA website as well as Taylor & Francis Online  
• Download and citation statistics for your article  
• Rapid online publication  
• Input from, and dialog with, expert editors and editorial boards  
• Retention of full copyright of your article  
• Guaranteed legacy preservation of your article  
• Discounts and waivers for authors in developing regions  
Submit your manuscript to a Cogent OA journal at www.CogentOA.com   
Alkurdi et al., Cogent Business & Management (2021), 8: 1939930                                                                                                                                   
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2021.1939930                                                                                                                                                       
Page 21 of 21
